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• The single currency was expected to make balance of payments irrelevant
between the euro-area member states. This benign view has been challenged by
recent developments, especially as imbalances between euro-area central banks
have widened within the TARGET2 settlement system.
• Current-account developments can be misleading as indicators of financial-
account developments in countries that receive significant official support. Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain experienced significant private-capital inflows
from 2002 to 2007-09, followed by unambiguously massive outflows.
• We show that such reversals qualify as ‘sudden stops’. Euro-area sudden-stop
episodes were clustered in three periods: the global financial crisis, a period
following the agreement of the Greek programme and summer 2011. The timeline
suggests contagion effects were present.
• We find evidence of substitution of the private capital flows with public
components. In particular, weak banks in distressed countries took up a major
share of the central bank refinancing. The steady divergence of intra-Eurosystem
net balances mirrors this.
• In the short term, TARGET2 imbalances could be addressed by tightening collateral
requirements for central bank liquidity. For the longer term, the evidence that the
euro area has been subject to internal balance-of-payment crises should be taken
as a strong signal of weakness and as an invitation to reform its structures.
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1. See for example Carney
(2012), Giavazzi and
Spaventa (2011), Sinn
(2012); Martin Wolf in the
Financial Timeshas
reflected this view on a
number of occasions.
2. The Eurosystem is the
monetary authority of the
euro area, comprising the
European Central Bank and
the central banks of
countries using the euro.
3. Ingram (1973), p10.
4. European Commission
(1990), synthesis chapter,
p24.
THERE IS A VIEWthat the euro crisis is a balance-
of-payments crisis at least as much as a fiscal
crisis1. This claim could have a bearing on the
nature of the policy response, which thus far has
concentrated on strengthening budgetary disci-
pline and has treated external imbalances as a
second-order matter.
The issue has become more relevant with the
widening of imbalances between euro-area central
banks within the TARGET2 settlement system –
the Eurosystem's interbank payment system2. The
cumulated net position of the northern euro-area
central banks reached €800 billion in December
2011, being matched by the southern euro-area
central banks' equivalent negative position.
The balance-of-payments discussion lacks clarity,
however. First, it seems awkward to speak of bal-
ance-of-payments crises within a monetary union
that was designed to make such crises impossi-
ble. Second, few of the proponents of the balance-
of-payments crisis view have substantiated their
claims with clear evidence. Unlike a standard bal-
ance-of-payments crisis, within the euro area, cur-
rent-account deficits have adjusted partially and
slowly. Third, the relationship between TARGET2
balances and balance-of payment imbalances
remains confused.
The purpose of this paper is to fill these gaps. We
start in section 1 with a brief discussion of the
possibility of a balance-of-payment crisis within
a monetary union and an overview of the evolu-
tion of current-account balances. In section 2 we
analyse the evolution of private capital flows to
southern Europe before and during the euro crisis.
In section 3 we proceed to a more formal test and
apply standard sudden-stop criteria to the evolu-
tion of capital flows. In section 4 we discuss the
roles played by central banks and official financ-
ing. We return to policy issues in section 5 to dis-
cuss the consequences of our findings.
1 CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS?
In one of the earliest papers on European mone-
tary union, Ingram (1973) notes that in such a
union “payments imbalances among member
nations can be financed in the short run through
the financial markets, without need for interven-
tions by a monetary authority. Intracommunity
payments become analogous to interregional
payments within a single country”3. This view was
not challenged in the debate of the 1980s and the
1990s on the economics of Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU). It quickly became conventional
wisdom. The European Commission’s One Market,
One Moneyreport (1990) similarly posits that “a
major effect of EMU is that balance-of-payments
constraints will disappear [..]. Private markets will
finance all viable borrowers, and savings and
investment balances will no longer be constraints
at the national level”4. The important words here
are “all viable borrowers”, meaning that the budget
constraint applies to individual borrowers, not to
countries as such. In other words a solvent com-
pany in Italy or a solvent bank in Spain cannot be
cut off from market financing because of the situ-
ation of the sovereign or the households. There is
no such thing as a specific country-level intertem-
poral budget constraint – only those of individual
agents matter.
This view was so widespread in the early 1990s
that the Maastricht negotiators decided to exclude
members of the common currency from the bene-
fit of EU balance-of-payments assistance under
Article 143 of the Treaty – with the result that the
euro area was left without an instrument to pro-
vide assistance to Greece and had to rely in a first
step on bilateral loans from its member countries,
before the European Financial Stability Facility and
the European Stability Mechanism were created.
As reported in Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir
(2010), this exclusion had nothing to do with the
no-bail out clause. It was simply assumed that
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would become as unthinkable as they are within
countries5.
To our knowledge, the only one to challenge this
benign view was Peter Garber in a 1998 paper on
the role of TARGET in a crisis of monetary union
(Garber, 1998). The paper insightfully recognised
that the federal structure of the Eurosystem and
the corresponding continued existence of national
central banks with separate individual balance
sheets made it possible to imagine a speculative
attack within monetary union. According to Garber,
the precondition for an attack “must be scepticism
that a strong currency national central bank will
provide through TARGET unlimited credit in euros
to the weak national central banks”. His conclu-
sion is that “as long as some doubt remains about
the permanence of Stage III exchange rates, the
existence of the currently proposed structure of
the ECB and TARGET does not create additional
security against the possibility of an attack. Quite
the contrary, it creates a perfect mechanism to
make an explosive attack on the system”.
As said, the benign view prevailed during the first
ten years of EMU. It even continues to dominate
today. Indeed, casual data observation seems to
vindicate it. Figure 1 reports the 2007-11 evolu-
tion of current-account balances in the three non-
euro area EU countries and the three euro-area
countries with the highest deficits in 20076. It is
apparent that the two groups of countries have
not followed the same path: whereas adjustment
has been brutal for the first group, with deficits
amounting to 15 to 25 percent of GDP transformed
into surpluses over three or four years, it has been
5. The literature of the
1990s explored this
comparison and showed
that the Feldstein-Horioka
paradox vanishes entirely
when applied to regions
within countries. See for
example Bayoumi (1999).
6. We have excluded Cyprus
because of its small size.
03
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
very slow for the second. One may even wonder if
Greece and Portugal have adjusted at all. 
2 PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS
Assessing if there has been a balance-of-
payment crisis by looking at the evolution of the
current account is however a flawed approach. It is
adequate to look at the evolution of current-
account balances as long as it offers a mirror
image of net private capital flows. In a stand-alone
country, this is largely the case except for foreign
exchange interventions by the central bank – at
least as long as the country is not under an Inter-
national Monetary Fund programme. This is how-
ever not the case for monetary union, because the
financial account includes official capital flows.
The correct accounting identity (neglecting the
balance of the capital account as well as errors
and omissions) is:
(1) CAB + PCI + T2F + PGM +SMP = 0
in which CAB stands for the current-account bal-
ance, PCI for private capital inflows, T2F for
Eurosystem financing through the TARGET2
system (change in the net liability of the national
central bank vis-à-vis the rest of the Eurosystem),
PGM for financing through official IMF and Euro-
pean assistance, and SMP (Securities Markets
Programme) for European Central Bank purchases
of government securities from residents. Of these
five flows, four are recorded statistically and only
one (SMP) is not known.
In what follows we evaluate private capital inflows
to southern Europe from 2002-11 using monthly
Source: ECFIN Forecasts November 2011.
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Figure 1: A tale of two adjustments: current accounts outside and within the euro area
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7. Operations including the
Eurosystem monetary
policy operations as well as
for the settlement of posi-
tion in large-value net set-
tlement system that
effectively operate in euro.
8. See Kokkola (2010).
9. Deutsche Bundesbank
Annual Report 2010.
10. The multilateralisation
of the claims is an impor-
tant feature of the system.
It implies that any loss
resulting from a central
bank’s failure to settle its
debts would be shared
among all the members of
the Eurosystem, irrespec-
tive of their creditor or
debtor positions in the
TARGET2 system.
financial account data. Capital flows are taken
from national balance-of-payments as published
by national central banks, and we deduct from
them official inflows resulting from changes in
TARGET2 balances (see Box 1) and assistance
under IMF/EU programmes (see Appendices 1 and
2 for details).
As we want to focus on inflows and reversals, not
short-term fluctuations, and to compare evolu-
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Box 1: TARGET2
TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer) is the Eurosystem's
operational tool through which national central banks of member states provide payment and settlement
services for intra-euro area transactions. Intra-Eurosystem claims arise from different types of transac-
tions and they can or cannot have a 'real' counterpart: they might be the result of transfers of goods that
require a cross-border payment (ie imports) or the transfer of deposits to a different euro-area country.
When capital is transferred (eg a deposit is moved) from an Irish bank to a German bank via TARGET2, the
transaction is settled between the Irish central bank and the Bundesbank, with the former incurring a lia-
bility to the latter. TARGET2 can be used for all credit transfers in euro and it processes both interbank and
customer payments. There are transactions for which TARGET2 must be used7 but for all the other pay-
ments – interbank and commercial payments in euro – market participants are free to use TARGET2 or any
other payment system of their choice. Banks prefer the TARGET2 system because most banks in Europe
are reachable through it and payments are settled immediately (immediate finality of the transaction) and
in central bank money (allowing credit institutions to transfer money held in accounts with the central
bank among themselves)8.
The settlement of intra-Eurosystem payments via TARGET2 gives rise to cross-border obligations that are
aggregated and netted out at the end of each single business day, leaving national central banks with a
certain net TARGET2 balance (positive, negative or zero). There is no a priori limit to the transactions that
can be processed by the system – and therefore to the size of TARGET positions. Daily net balances are
generally remunerated at the respective interest rate for main refinancing operations9.
TARGET2 balances are balances that each central bank accumulates from the operations conducted vis-
à-vis other national central banks in the euro area, but the final balance is a claim or a liability against the
ECB, the ultimate manager of liquidity. In a way, it is as if the ECB were intermediating all transactions
among national central banks10.
Until 2007, TARGET2 positions remained close to balance. From 2007 (and more so with the intensifying
of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010) the balances started to diverge, with Germany becoming the largest
creditor and Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal being traditional net borrowers and Italy moving into a
negative position during the summer of 2011. The huge increase in TARGET2 claims and liabilities has
recently drawn attention, triggering a debate on the forces behind this steady divergence (see Sinn and
Source: Bruegel, national central banks.
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11. Deutsche Bundesbank
Monthly Report, March
2011.
12. We cannot exactly repli-
cate the evolution of the
international investment
position simply by cumulat-
ing financial account flows .
This is because the interna-
tional investment position
can be subject to major val-
uation effects, including the
effect of market prices and
of exchange rates (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006).
second outflow in early 2011. In Ireland, private
capital inflows dropped the first time in the early
stage of the financial crisis (2008Q3). The outflow
then paused temporarily, starting again when the
Greek programme was agreed in the second
quarter of 2010. In Spain also there was a first,
short-lived outflow in spring 2010, followed by a
second, in summer 2011, concurrent with the one
experience by Italy.
3 EVIDENCE OF SUDDEN STOPS
Figure 2 provides prima facieevidence of sudden
stops of capital inflows. We complement this
observation with a more formal test based on the
standard methodology introduced by Calvo et al
(2004). The Calvo methodology is based on
monthly data and identifies a sudden stop as an
episode in which there is at least one observation
with year-on-year capital inflows two standard
deviations below the mean. Calvo’s methodology
has two advantages: it provides a more rigorous
and systematic comparison of the experience
within the euro area with the experience of
emerging countries; and it dates the sudden stop.
After a sudden stop has been identified, it is con-
sidered to start with the first observation for which
tions across countries, we plot for all countries
cumulated capital inflows in proportion to their
2007 GDPs, taking as a starting point the end-
2001 net investment position of the country as
recorded by Eurostat12. Figure 2 on the next page
presents the results for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain. In each case the blue line gives
total cumulated flows, and the red line total cumu-
lated private flows.
Figure 2 provides evidence that all five countries
experienced significant private capital inflows
from 2002 to 2007-09, followed by unambiguous
and rather sudden outflows. In Greece inflows and
outflows each amounted to about 40 percent of
2007 GDP. In Ireland inflows were limited but
outflows reached 70 percent of 2007 GDP. In the
other three countries outflows were less sizeable
and started later, but nevertheless they were of
significant size.
It is interesting also to observe the timing of
reversals: capital stopped flying into Greece even
before the announcement in October 2009 by the
Papandreou government that public finance data
had misreported deficit and debt. In Portugal there
was a noticeable outflow at the time of the first
Greek programme in spring 2010, followed by a
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Wollmerhaeuser, 2011; Buiter, Rahbari and Michels, 2011; Bindseil and Koenig, 2012; and Bornhorst and
Mody, 2012).
The build-up of such imbalances presupposes that capital does not flow uniformly across countries, mean-
ing that central banks that report a deficit position have been systematically settling more outward pay-
ments than inward payments. In other words, some countries have been constantly net borrowers and
other countries have been net lenders. This development is closely related to the tensions on the interbank
markets and the increase in the perceived country risk in southern Europe. While payments between
credit institutions can or cannot be processed via TARGET2, the transfers related to the Eurosystem mon-
etary policy operations are managed through the system, so when the use of central bank liquidity
becomes unevenly distributed across countries, TARGET2 balances will reflect it. The steep increase in
TARGET2 claims and liabilities from 2008 onwards suggests that tensions in the financial system may
have an important role in explaining the divergence. In a period of financial crisis, banks in countries
undergoing net payment outflows (eg deposit flights) need liquidity but can find it difficult to refinance
on the interbank market (also because of the shortage of valuable collateral), and will therefore resort
more to central bank liquidity than banks in countries to which money is flowing.
Germany is a good example of this mechanism: the volume of central bank refinancing attributable to
German banks decreased from €250 billion at the start of 2007 to €130 billion in 201011, signalling that
German banks have been reducing on average their reliance on central bank liquidity. Symmetrically,
demand for ECB liquidity from banks located in troubled countries increased considerably over the same
period. In light of these considerations, TARGET2 imbalances can therefore be interpreted as evidence of
a changing distribution in countries’ refinancing operations, and as a compensation mechanism that
allows sound banks in stressed countries to cover their liquidity needs.06
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Source: Bruegel calculations with national and Eurostat data. Figures show cumulative capital inflows relative to the inter-
national investment position debt in 2001.
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capital inflows are one standard deviation below
the mean, and to end with the first observation for
which capital inflows return above one standard
deviation below the mean (see Appendix 1 for
details). In Figure 3, we present the application of
this methodology to the case of Greece. The grey
areas correspond to sudden stop episodes.
It is apparent in Figure 3 that the Calvo methodol-
ogy provides a straightforward way to identify a
sudden stop that takes place after a sustained
period of capital inflows, but the methodology
yields more ambiguous results when it comes to
identifying sudden stops that take place during
protracted periods of capital outflows. An alterna-
tive to the Calvo methodology is to freeze the
thresholds after the first episode, instead of de
facto toughening the criterion, as apparent in
Figure 3. We use both methodologies, and find no
significant difference in results except for Ireland,
for which the fixed-threshold methodology results
in the identification of a series of sudden stop
episodes throughout 2010 (see Appendix 1).
The dating of sudden stop episodes helps identify
contagion effects, showing how reversals of capi-
tal flows spread among crisis countries. Figure 4
shows the number of countries in a sudden stop
episode (counting only episodes of at least three
months in order to eliminate short-term varia-
tions). We find three sudden stop periods:
• The global financial crisis.The rise in risk aver-
sion and the clogging of the interbank market
affected both Greece and Ireland. Capital
started flowing out of Greece early in 2008
(between March and June), before the Lehman
shock and well before the misreporting of fiscal
statistics was revealed. This phase was fol-
lowed by another episode between October
2008 and January 2009, corresponding with
the intensification of the financial crisis. At the
same time, private capital also started leaving
Ireland, which entered a long sudden stop
phase (2008Q3 to 2009Q1).
• Spring 2010. The agreement of the IMF/EU
programme marked the beginning of a third
Greek episode (April 2010 to July 201013),
which also triggered an impressive contagion
effect. Portugal entered a sudden stop
immediately but it was relatively short,
whereas Ireland experienced a serious and
prolonged capital outflow that eventually led
the country to ask for support.
• End 2011. The third wave of sudden stops
involved Italy14 and Spain – both put under
increased scrutiny and pressure by sovereign
bond markets during the summer – and Portu-
gal. Contrary to reasonable expectations, we
cannot detect (at least using Calvo’s method-
ology) any episode of sudden stop for Portugal
in May 2011, even though the cumulative cap-
ital flows continued to fall steadily. In this
respect, it is important to recall that we are not
taking the Securities Markets Programme
(SMP) out of the financial account and this
could partly account for the overestimation of
capital inflows.
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 4: Sudden stop episodes in southern euro-area countries, 2009-11
13. June 2010 would not
satisfy the requirement of
being at least one standard
deviation below average.
However, given that the
year-on-year change in cap-
ital inflow was almost zero
in June 2010 and it is pre-
ceded and followed by two
observations falling below
the second threshold, we
decided to include it  in the
sudden-stop period.
14. As in the case of Greece,
the observation of October
2011 would not satisfy the
criterion, but the year-on-
year positive change is very
small and followed by two
observations below the
second threshold, so we
include it in the sudden
stop.08
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Public support has taken three forms in the euro
area: EU/IMF assistance programmes; provision
by the Eurosystem of liquidity to the banking
sector (captured by the development of TARGET
balances); and ECB purchases of sovereign bonds
under the SMP. As previously discussed, we have
not been able to build estimates for the third com-
ponent, so our estimates of private capital inflows
tend to err on the optimistic side.
Figure 5 shows the relative size and importance
of the two first components in filling the void left
by private capital flight. The decomposition is
obtained simply by cumulating separately
changes in TARGET net liabilities, programme
flows, and our measure of private capital inflows
over the same period (2002-11) for all countries.
The sum of these three components has been plot-
ted against the cumulated total inflow (the official
financial account data).
For Greece, at the end of 2011, programme and
TARGET liabilities accounted respectively for 44
percent and 56 percent of total official financing.
For other countries, however, TARGET financing
was by far the largest component. Intra-Eurosys-
tem liabilities amounted to 69 percent of GDP in
Ireland (at end-2011Q3) and 32 percent in Portu-
gal (December 2011), against only 14 percent
and 19 percent respectively accounted for by the
programme in the two countries. ECB financing
has also been sizable in Italy and Spain, amount-
ing to 13 percent and 11 percent of GDP respec-
tively, as of November 2011.
These findings help to shed light on the debate on
the role of TARGET2 financing. Early contributions
focused mostly on the link between TARGET bal-
ances and current-account balances, arguing that
the former financed the latter to some extent. As
we have shown, the pace of current-account
adjustment in the euro area was clearly much
slower than for non-euro area EU countries. Sub-
stitution of private-capital inflows by public
inflows, especially Eurosystem financing, helped
accommodate persistent current-account deficits
‘The three programme countries – and more recently Italy and Spain – have experienced significant
reversals of capital inflows. This was not evident from the official balance-of-payment statistics. These
flows have prevented the official financial account from shrinking.’
An important question is whether capital outflows
simply result from sovereign crises, ie from the
disposal by non-residents of their portfolios of
government securities, or if their impact is
broader, also affecting solvent private agents15. It
is only in the second case that it is justified to
challenge conventional wisdom and speak of bal-
ance-of-payment crises instead of sovereign
crises. Lack of detailed comparable data does not
make it possible to proceed to a formal test, but
discussion can draw on orders of magnitude in the
cases of Italy and Spain.
In the Italian case, data holdings of government
debt by agents measured at nominal value are
available and can be compared to balance-of-
payment flows. Outflows during the end-2011
episode were significantly larger than the selling
of government bonds by non-residents, which
suggests that other agents were also affected by
the sudden stop. For Spain, the same can be done
but with quarterly data only. Again, the data indi-
cates that the outflows meaningfully exceeded
what could be accounted for by the withdrawal of
non-residents from the government bond market.
These are rough assessments only, and our esti-
mate of capital outflows is admittedly imperfect
because we do not take into account the impact
of the SMP. But our reading of the evidence is that
the data tends to confirm the view that capital out-
flows exceeded what can be explain by the with-
drawal of non-residents from the government
bond market.
4 THE ROLE OF OFFICIAL FINANCING AND THE 
TARGET2 DEBATE
The evidence presented in section 3 shows that the
three programme countries – and more recently
Italy and Spain – have experienced significant
reversals of capital inflows. This was not evident
from the official balance-of-payment statistics,
because the private capital outflows were com-
pensated for by an equally sizeable increase in
public capital inflows. These flows have prevented
the official financial account from shrinking.
15. See Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012) for evidence
on the withdrawal of non-
residents from the govern-
ment bonds market.09
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Source: Bruegel based on national central banks, IMF, ECFIN, EFSF.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of cumulative capital inflows (% of 2007 GDP)
in a context in which capital markets were no
longer willing to accommodate them.
However, large current-account balances per se
are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for incurring significant TARGET liabilities (Bind-
seil and Winckler, 2012). What was instead cru-
cial was howthese current-account balances were
financed in the euro area before the outbreak of
the financial crisis. As stressed by the European
Commission already in 2006 (European Commis-
sion, 2006), the countries with large current-
account deficits (Greece, Portugal and Spain) were
mostly financed via portfolio debt securities and
bank loans, whereas the contribution of foreign
direct investment was very limited. Such a financ-
ing structure, biased towards banks’ intermedia-
tion, rendered the deficit countries very exposed
to the unwinding of capital inflows, especially in a
financial crisis. We have shown that a reversal of
private inflows indeed took place and that it was
sizeable enough to qualify as a sudden stop. The
Eurosystem has provided a buffer against the
associated drying up of liquidity on the interbank
market, and this is reflected in the evolution of
intra-Eurosystem claims.
Reliance on Eurosystem financing primarily
reflects the distress of euro-area banking systems
in the aftermath of the global crisis. The difficulty
that banks had to refinance on the interbank
market led the Eurosystem to perform this stan-10
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dard role as a lender of last resort to the banking
system through the provision of liquidity in large
amounts. From October 2008 onwards, the fixed-
rate, full allotment procedure adopted by the ECB
made a large part of the euro-area banking system
reliant on central bank financing, while weak
banks in distressed countries ended up taking up
a disproportionately large part of the central bank
refinancing (Figure 6). These figures do not
include the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
extended by single national central banks to their
banking systems. ELA – the risk being entirely
borne at national level – has been extensively
used in Ireland and more recently also in Greece,
where the government has approved €60 billion
in guarantees to facilitate the process (IMF,
2011). The operation is generally recorded in cen-
tral banks’ balance sheets under 'Other assets'
(Figure 6), an item that had jumped to €45 billion
in Ireland and €58 billion in Greece as of Novem-
ber 201116. The rationale for ELA is to ensure that
the banking system can access liquidity even
when it faces shortages of good collateral to
pledge at the ECB. Therefore, any tightening of col-
lateral requirements that makes it more difficult
for banks to access ECB refinancing could result
in a larger share of the demand for central bank
liquidity being covered by national emergency liq-
uidity assistance.
These developments raise an analytical question
and a policy question. The analytical question is
if the low cost of ECB refinancing and its long
maturity (especially but not only since the launch
Source: Bruegel based on national central banks and ECB.
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Figure 6: Share of countries affected by sudden stops in take-up of Eurosystem liquidity and ELA
of the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Opera-
tions (LTRO) in December 2011) might have con-
tributed to the increase in demand for Eurosystem
financing, crowding out private capital flows. The
correlation between private capital outflows and
increased reliance on Eurosystem financing
should be treated with care, because causality
could run in both directions. However, for each of
our three periods of capital outflows we find hard
to reconcile the view that private capital could be
been crowded out with the sequence of events.
The first period started before the adoption by the
ECB of its fixed rate, full allotment procedure. In
the second period, the coincidence of the drops in
private capital flows experienced by Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal suggests that it was the change
in market sentiment rather than the availability of
ECB financing that triggered the rise in intra-
Eurosystem liabilities. Similarly, capital outflows
from Italy and Spain in the second half of 2011
took place before, not after, the extension of the
LTRO to three years.
Turning to policy, several proposals have been
advanced to shelter national central banks from
the perceived risk involved in the accumulation of
positive TARGET2 balances. This risk however
must be qualified:
• First, as far as TARGET balances reflect the
uneven distribution of central bank liquidity
within the Eurosystem, they do not entail spe-
cific risks for the creditor central banks, over
and above the risk from monetary policy oper-
16. There is lack of trans-
parency in both the financ-
ing and the amount of ELA,
but there is consensus on
the fact that the operation
is recorded under ‘Other
assets’ (see, for example,
Buiter et al, 2011). This is
reinforced by the jump
observable in this item in
crisis periods. For Greece in
particular ‘Other items’
reached €58 billion in
November 2011, very close
to the €60 billion in guaran-
tees the Greek government
approved to back ELA (IMF,
2011).11
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ations. Losses from Eurosystem monetary
policy operations could occur in case that there
is counterparty failure and the value of collat-
eral posted at the ECB is not sufficient to cover
the claim entirely. Such losses would however
be shared by national central banks according
to the extent of their participation in the
Eurosystem's capital. In other words, the pos-
sible loss faced by each national central bank
would be the same, irrespective of the size of
the TARGET claims/liabilities recorded in their
own balance sheets. For example the Bundes-
bank, being the largest shareholder in ECB cap-
ital, would bear the greatest loss even if private
capital flows from the periphery had been
directed massively towards France rather than
towards Germany. 
• Second, the only scenario in which TARGET
would represent an actual additional risk for
national central banks would be if one (or
more) country decided to leave the euro area.
In that case, the net claims against the rest of
the system would constitute an additional risk.
Any approach that would be interpreted as the
introduction of a hedge against the break-up of
the euro would involve the risk of sending the
message that this break-up is indeed likely.
• Third, any proposal to limit the size of TARGET
balances to a fixed threshold underestimates
both the importance of a smoothly functioning
payment system in a currency union, and the
risk of speculative attacks that such limits
would imply. The purpose of introducing the
single currency was to overcome the weak-
nesses of fixed-exchange regimes, and this
requires all capital flows between members to
be treated in the same way. Placing caps on the
size of TARGET balances would imply that euros
would be entirely fungible across countries
only up to a limit (Bindseil and Koenig, 2012),
and this would in turn implicitly amount to the
creation of two currencies. The threshold would
offer a clear target to speculators in the same
way that limited reserves offer a target in a
fixed exchange-rate regime. Other proposals
include the 'collateralising' of the TARGET bal-
ances of weaker countries and their disposal
for an annual settlement (Sinn and Wollmer-
haeuser, 2012). Though more reasonable in
principle, such solutions would be very difficult
to implement safely at present, given the size
of TARGET balances and the shortage of good
collateral. Again, an approach of this sort would
give an incentive for speculation against the
possibility of the exhaustion of collateral
reserves or the inability/unwillingness of coun-
tries to mobilise resources for periodic settle-
ments. 
TARGET2 balances are the symptom of the uneven
distribution of central bank liquidity within the
Eurosystem. Those who focus on TARGET2 imbal-
ances as having significance beyond this confuse
consequence and causes. Rather than tinkering
with the symptom, with the risk of creating doubts
about the very viability of the euro, attention
should focus on curing the disease, in other words
the underlying banking-system problems.
The Eurosystem can tackle the short-term high
demand for liquidity by weak banks, against col-
lateral of declining quality, by tightening the qual-
ity of the required collateral. This would be likely
to reduce TARGET imbalances and is an option the
central bank can consider without hampering the
functioning of the euro area. Naturally, however, it
can only be contemplated if banks are adequately
recapitalised and if the threat of a vicious circle of
bank and sovereign insolvency is removed. The
introduction of a three-year LTRO at the end of
2011, and the extension of the range of eligible
collateral, resulted from the Eurosystem's assess-
ment that the risk of a funding crisis in major
countries was significant enough for a massive
provision of liquidity to be necessary, even though
it implied almost by definition a widening of the
TARGET imbalances. Only if the situation nor-
malises further will the Eurosystem be able to mop
up liquidity, reinstate its collateral policy and
thereby contribute to the gradual unwinding of
these imbalances.
This, in turn, requires underlying factors that con-
tribute to bank weakness to be addressed: bad
loans on bank balance sheets must be provi-
sioned, and recapitalisation must take place wher-
ever needed; public finances must be made
convincingly sustainable; and on the macro front,
persistent current account deficits can also be
tackled through the 'Excessive Imbalances Proce-
dure' recently adopted as part of the so-called Six-
Pack legislation (European Commission, 2011).12
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Private capital flows will only return after the dis-
ease has been addressed.
5 CONCLUSIONS
European monetary union involved from the
outset many ‘known unknowns’ and a few
‘unknown unknowns’. The possibility that coun-
tries within the monetary union would experience
balance-of-payment crises belonged to the latter
category: conventional wisdom in research and
policy was that among euro-area countries, bal-
ance-of-payments would become as irrelevant as
among regions within a country. Yet developments
since 2009 have challenged the wisdom of this
view.
In this Policy Contribution, we have examined in
detail the financial account of five southern Euro-
pean countries, and have provided evidence of a
dramatic reversal in their private components.
Considering only the private capital flows, we find
that all countries have undergone episodes of
sudden stops, more usually seen in emerging mar-
kets. These episodes were clustered in three
phases (the outbreak of the global financial crisis;
spring 2010 at the time of the launch of the Greek
programme; and the second half of 2011), which
suggests that there has been contagion across
countries. 
Countries within the euro area can experience
such crises because they do not exhibit the same
degree of market and policy integration as regions
within a country. Regions rarely rely on their own
banking systems, implying that the bursting of a
regional credit bubble will not translate into a
banking crisis. Should a banking crisis neverthe-
less develop, it does not affect the regional state
because responsibility for bank rescue and
restructuring is generally a federal competence.
Regions therefore can hardly be subject to confi-
dence crises of the sort that affected euro-area
countries.
A striking feature of the euro-area crisis is that
whereas capital outflows have been dramatic, the
current accounts of deficit countries have
adjusted only partially. Decomposition of capital
inflows highlights the crucial role of Eurosystem
financing in mitigating the effect of private capital
outflows (with a contribution of international
financial assistance of a comparable order of mag-
nitude in the case of Greece). The injection of liq-
uidity has helped accommodate persistent
current-account adjustments in the southern part
of the euro area, but most importantly it has pro-
tected countries that could no longer rely on
adjusting their exchange rates from the full nega-
tive impact of a sudden stop. Given the level of
integration of euro-area financial markets, the
effects of unmitigated sudden stops in southern
Europe would have endangered the entire system
and put at risk the survival of the single currency.
The smooth functioning of a payment system is
essential for maintaining the stability of the finan-
cial system, preserving confidence in the common
currency and allowing the implementation of a
single monetary policy. Introducing constraints on
the operations of the payment system would sug-
gest an unwillingness to provide unlimited liquid-
ity across the euro area and open a window for
speculation. The more important question is how
to address the underlying disease. Together with a
gradual mopping up of exceptional liquidity provi-
sion and the tightening of collateral requirements,
the cure is likely to require interventions to foster
the sustainability of public finances, the resilience
of the financial system and the reduction of the
remaining external imbalance. However confi-
dence cannot be regained overnight and in the
meantime, the Eurosystem should not be blamed
for playing fully its role.
For the longer run, the evidence that the euro area
went through internal balance-of-payment crises
should be taken as a clear signal of weakness and
as an invitation to reform its structures. Contrary
to common belief, a monetary union of this sort is
closer to a fixed exchange-rate system among
independent countries than to a fully integrated
economy. Financial-market participants have
realised this and certainly will not forget it. In
response, the fostering of a pan-European bank-
ing industry and the creation of a banking union
with centralised supervision and access to
resources to recapitalise weak financial institu-
tions should feature high on the policy agenda.
Only a closer integration of markets and policies
will preserve the euro area from the risk of further
attacks.13
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY
Data
Following Eichengreen et al(2006) we focus on the financial-account balance, a comprehensive vari-
able that includes Net Foreign Direct Investments, Net Portfolio Investment and Net Other Investment17.
To maximise the chances of detecting a sudden stop episode, we work with monthly data from national
central banks or statistical offices. Only for Ireland we have to use quarterly data and adjust the com-
putations accordingly18.
From the financial account we derive a measure of private capital flows, constructed as the official
financial account net of the changes in TARGET2 balances and of the inflow associated to disburse-
ments under the IMF/EU programmes. Both these components are classified in balance-of-payments
statistics under ‘Other investment’ (respectively of monetary authorities and of general government)
where they can be clearly identified, provided that the balance of payments is sufficiently disaggre-
gated (see Table A1 for an example). Data on TARGET2 balances is not available for all countries over
the same time span19, but we include them from the earliest date we have.
Table A1: Greece – detecting TARGET2 in the balance of payments (figures in € millions)
May 11 June 11 July 11 Aug 11 Sept 11 Oct 11 Nov 11 Dec 11
Financial Account
– Other Investment 8312 5453 -5600 6248 3304 4934 3627 -4565
Liabilities – Monetary
Authorities
Change in 8313 5452 -5600 6248 3304 4934 3627 -4565
TARGET2 liabilities
Source: Central Bank of Greece.
Unfortunately there is no fully accurate way to account for the impact of the ECB’s Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP). First, the ECB only publishes the aggregate outstanding portfolio without any country
decomposition, neither of the stock nor of the purchases. Estimates of the composition exist, but they
would anyway tell us nothing about the nationality of the agents the ECB bought the bonds from. For
example, if the ECB bought Greek bonds from non-resident holders (as seems reasonable given the
decline in non-residents’ bond holdings observable over the same period), this would not immediately
affect the Greek total financial-account balance, as bonds would only pass from one non-resident entity
to another. But at the same time, the capital inflows represented by the foreign ownership of those
bonds would change from private to public. Given the impossibility of making any assumption that
allows the SMP to be taken into account, our measure of private capital inflows is likely to overestimate
to some extent the actual private capital inflows.
Identification of sudden stops
Using this measure of private capital flows, we assess if a country has experienced a sudden stop. Fol-
lowing the methodology proposed by Calvo et al (2004) we identified a sudden stop as an episode
with the following characteristics:
• At least one month in which capital flows fall (year-on-year) two standard deviation below the sample
mean
• The start of a sudden stop coincides with the first months in which year-on-year change in capital
flows drops one standard deviation below the mean (obviously a fall by two standard deviations
below the mean would also qualify as the trigger of a sudden stop, provided that it is not an extem-
poraneous one). 
17. Calvo et al (2004) deals
with a panel of many
countries (including also
emerging ones), which
makes it difficult to have
conistent financial account
data at monthly frequency.
Therefore he uses a proxy
constructed as the Trade
balance net of change in
foreign reserves. We do not
have such problem because
balance of payment data for
Euro Area countries are
generally published by
Central Banks at monthly
frequency.
18. In particular: when deal-
ing with monthly data all
the computations are done
on a minimum of 24
months of observations,
whereas the equivalent with
quarterly data is a mini-
mum period of 8 quarters.
19. For Portugal and Greece
we have data since 2002;
for Ireland since 2003; for
Italy we would have data
since 2004 but due to some
inconsistencies between
yearly and monthly data
before 2004, we consider
TARGET balances only start-
ing from this date; for Spain
we only have data since
2007.15
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• The end of a sudden stop coincides with change in capital flows reverting to the mean, namely above
average minus one standard deviation.
Again following Calvo et al(2004), both average and standard deviations are computed in each month
over an expanding window with starting date fixed at the earliest data available and a minimum width
of 24 months. Moments and threshold are computed in each month t considering only data up to (t-1),
so excluding the potential crisis year. In this way we obtain ‘adaptive’ thresholds that keep track of the
past evolution of capital flows but at the same time incorporate the increase in the volatility of capital
flows recorded towards the end of the time series and toughen the requirements accordingly. However,
thresholds take some time to adapt and therefore we risk detecting too many episodes of sudden stops
especially in periods of high volatility (eg during the financial crisis). Therefore we decide to comple-
ment the Calvo et alcriteria with an additional requirement and consider only episodes of sudden stops
that last for at least three months. The time series of financial accounts have a different length for all
countries, but for the purpose of identifying sudden stops we restricted the sample to the same period
for all (2002-11). We did this for the sake of consistency, but we also replicated the analysis consid-
ering the whole (different) periods, and results are unaffected.
The Calvo methodology results in toughening the criterion for sudden stops in the case of repeated
episodes. For this reason we have explored an alternative methodology to identify the months of sudden
stop.
We ‘freeze’ the thresholds at the value observed the last month before a significant capital drop20and
compared post-sudden stop observations with the pre-sudden stop threshold. This variation does not
change anything relevant for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain21whereas it makes a difference for Ire-
land, stretching the second Irish episode over two more quarters. This is probably due to the fact that
quarterly data miss most of the information given by monthly data and they are more sensitive to
changes in the threshold.
Figure A1: Alternative dating of sudden stops in the case of Ireland
Source: Bruegel.
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20. We identified the huge
capital drop by looking at
the evolution of monthly
financial account flows
compared to their long-term
average (the same drops
are also evident in the
cumulative capital inflows
graphs).
21. Only the third episode
for Greece lasts one month
longer, until September
2011.16
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APPENDIX 2: DISBURSEMENTS UNDER IMF/EU PROGRAMMES
Greece (Source: ECFIN)
Disbursement (€bn) Euro area IMF Total
May 2010 14.5 5.5 20
September 2010 6.5 2.6 9.1
December 2010 2.5 2.5
January 2011 6.5 6.5
March 2011 10.9 4.1 15
July 2011 8.7 3.2 11.9
December 2011 5.8 20.1 8
Portugal (ECFIN, IMF, EFSF)
Disbursement (€bn) EFSF EFSM IMF Total
May 2011 1.75 6.1 7.85
June 2011 5.8 4.75 10.55
September 2011 7 3.98 10.98
October 2011 0.6 0.6
December 2011 2.9 2.9
Ireland (ECFIN, IMF, EFSF)*
Disbursement (€bn) EFSF EFSM IMF UK Total
January 2011 5 5.8 10.8
February 2011 3.3 3.3
March 2011 3.4 3.5
May 2011 3 1.58 4.58
September 2011 2 1.48 3.48
October 2011 0.5 0.5 1
November 2011 3 3
December 2011 3.9 3.9
* data has been aggregated at quarterly level for the sudden stop exercise